The Psychology of Walks and Singles

With all the current debate surrounding the shift, increased strikeout rates, and the overall aesthetic direction of baseball, one question, while underlying many of these discussions, has rarely been faced head-on: Why is it that walks are good, but singles are bad?

Of course, you’ve probably never heard anyone say that singles are bad in such simple and direct terms. But you will certainly have heard players praised for their ability to draw walks, while singles hitters are not held in nearly such regard. The psychological sentiment behind this phenomenon is real, and in looking at this issue, it is clear that the mindset surrounding walks and singles could use an adjustment. By changing the underlying assumptions about the relative merits of walks and singles, baseball might be able to address some of the aesthetic concerns that have been driving the debates that are currently engulfing the sport.

Listen to commentators, read analyses, or hear from managers and agents, and you will find evidence of a narrative wherein walks are praised and glorified. Being able to get on base via a walk is certainly a valuable skill, and it is not to be diminished by any means. However, it’s worth wondering whether the act of taking a base on balls warrants the heightened language with which we so often describe it. A hitter “draws” or “coaxes” or “works” a walk from a pitcher. He earns an RBI for an offensive feat if he walks with the bases loaded. On the defensive side, walks are “dreaded,” a rally-starting, inning-ruining menace.

Meanwhile, singles seem old-timey and from a bygone era of inefficient and ineffective baseball – like wool uniforms. Players are bemoaned for being “just” singles hitters. Singles are not described with the same positive metaphorical language as walks are – they “sneak” or “squeeze” through, or “find a hole,” or “fall in,” none of which suggests a great deal of skill on the part of the batter. Baseball has evolved into the game of Three True Outcomes and today’s hitters will bluntly tell you about the uselessness of the single. If the walk is seemingly so celebrated, then why is the single so reviled?

From a statistical point of view, singles are better than walks (hope you were sitting down for that revelation). Looking at wOBA or linear weights and run expectancies, you can quickly see that singles become more and more valuable compared to walks as you add runners to the base paths, and only when there are no runners on base are walks as good as singles.

Singles are also more probable. Singles are the most probable positive offensive event in baseball. When you combine their value with their actual chance of happening during a plate appearance, singles are by far the most valuable offensive event in baseball – creating more expected value in 2018 than any two other events combined.

A brief charting of cumulative 2018 season stats and wOBA weights (wBB, w1B, w2B, etc.) shows this efficiently:

With all this information easily accessible, how can the mindset of the glorified walk and the denigrated single take hold? Why is something that is factually more valuable held in lower regard than something less valuable?

One reason might be the never-ending search for well-defined, easily attributable data. Walks are just simpler than singles. You do not have to engage as many messy variables and what-ifs with walks. Like strikeouts, walks are more easily attributed to a single player than singles and other hit events. Things like shifted defenses, weather, and myriad other factors can influence whether a batted ball becomes a single or not. A quality hard-hit ball can be an out, whereas a squibbing bunt or weak blooper can turn into a single. A single can be even be determined post hoc by a charitable official scorer. In sum: Walks are easier to identify, quantify, and individually attribute than singles. People can easily attribute a walk to the skill of the hitter (or lack thereof on the part of the pitcher).

Attribution is important for baseball players, coaches, executives, staffers, and even fans of the game. In fact, attribution is extremely important for everyone. We humans really like to make attributions. We like things to have simple and clear causes and effects. We like to know both why things happen and the role we play in causing those events. Psychologists have studied attribution formally for almost 100 years, with the first attribution research starting with Heider in the 1920s, leading to his first theory of attribution in 1958. Attribution theory has evolved through a couple of generations since Heider, with the most meaningful advancements coming from Kelley and, most recently, Weiner.

In Weiner’s three-dimensional model of attribution, the causes of any event are broken into dimensions of locus, stability, and controllability. The locus dimension refers to whether causes are internal or external, with internal causes including a person’s own skill level, abilities, and decisions. External causes include luck or the skills and abilities of others. This strikes at the heart of the single/walk issue in relation to sabermetrics. Walks are much more easily attributed to internal causes for hitters compared to singles and are therefore easier to assign to a specific player’s skill base. This does not mean that walks are simply a function of a player’s skill and singles have nothing to do with a player’s skill or abilities. But given the factors mentioned before – weather, defensive placement and ability, the vagaries of baseball scoring – it’s just easier to quantify a player’s role in getting a walk compared to getting a single.

This shouldn’t keep sabermetricians from delving into how much a player’s skill and abilities influence their offensive outcomes, of course. This is obviously an ongoing topic of interest, with the recent development and refinement of DRC+ and other offensive metrics. The ease of making internal attributions for walks may play a role in how easily and frequently a hitter’s ability to “draw” or “coax” walks dominates offensive narratives and leads to feelings or expressions of pride in that accomplishment.

Conversely, although a single is factually more valuable than a walk, it is also more difficult to attribute to a hitter’s skill. The potential for and sometimes correct use of external attributions in relation to singles does not lead to the same feelings of pride or self-esteem in the hitter’s accomplishment. Rather, external attributions are associated with feelings of gratefulness or thankfulness when outcomes are successful –and indeed, singles are sometimes described as “gifted” to batters.

Along with the locus of attributions, the other dimensions of attribution theory speak to this walk/single distinction as well. The stability dimension refers to causes of events that are stable or unstable over time. Stable attributions can include things like skills or physical limitations if the person does not believe those things can change over time. Unstable attributions include things like injury, illness, bad weather, or other factors that change more rapidly. Walk rates stabilize much more quickly across time than singles. Accordingly, people feel that they have a stronger and more stable foundation in making attributions about walks compared to singles. This stability is associated with feelings that outcomes are more easily predictable in the future. Meanwhile, unstable attributions lead to feelings of helplessness or hopelessness because of the unpredictability and erratic nature of the outcomes.

The final attribution dimension, controllability, refers to whether the outcome is under the control of the performer. For example, a person’s effort, attention, and actions are controllable whereas external or environmental factors are not. In baseball, it is much easier for a hitter to control whether he walks than whether he singles. He cannot control the umpire’s decision on a pitch call, but his decision to not swing the bat controls whether a walk is a possible outcome. With singles, though, all of the external and environmental factors play a much larger role in the outcome of the plate appearance, and the hitter’s decision to swing the bat does not have the same level of controllability in creating singles.

Like internal attributions, when things work out well for controllable attributions, the hitter feels pride in controlling the positive outcome. When things do not work out well, the dimension of controllability can be associated with guilt for these more controllable outcomes. For instance, in earning a walk, a hitter would feel pride. In failing to walk, a hitter would feel guilt for swinging at a bad pitch. For uncontrollable attributions and outcomes, like singles, a hitter might feel thankful or grateful for hitting a single, and could feel anger or hostility when a single is taken away by factors not under his control – like a defensive shift or an exceptional play.

Along with attribution theory, a different way to understand the mindset that values walks and devalues singles may be through counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking refers to thinking about “what might have been,” and how things may have turned out differently than what actually (factually) happened. Of course, the full array of psychological factors behind this single/walk phenomenon is a bit more complex, but counterfactual thinking may help to explain the illogical mindset behind the narrative that values walks over singles.

Counterfactual thinking can involve both upward and downward counterfactuals. Upward counterfactuals involve thinking about how things could have been better. This thinking typically follows negative events (“If I had set an alarm, I wouldn’t have been late”), and can make a person feel even worse about a bad situation. Upward counterfactual thinking can also motivate a person to prevent that negative event from happening again. Downward counterfactuals, meanwhile, involve thinking about how things could have been worse. This typically follows situations when a negative event was avoided (“If I had been standing a couple of feet to the right, that tree limb would have fallen on me”), and can lead to feelings of relief.

In baseball, the single lends itself to an upward counterfactual thought process. The natural comparison for a single is to look at the other hit events (doubles, triples, home runs). Since that is the least of all hits, the hitter might have a thought process similar to: “If I’d only hit it harder/higher/etc., I could have gotten a double/triple/etc.” This would not only lead to feelings of regret but would motivate hitters to avoid that negative situation– in this case, hitting a lowly single – in the future, because better alternatives exist.

Conversely, a walk lends itself to downward counterfactuals because a walk is not compared to hit events, but with other non-swinging events – strikeouts. When it comes to non-swinging offensive events, a walk is the most successful offensive outcome (except a hit-by-pitch, which can have negative consequences for the hitter). The thought process in this situation, then, might be something like this: “If the umpire had called that borderline pitch a strike, then I would have struck out.” This would lead to positive feelings of relief and maintenance of the status quo. There is no motivation to change behavior, as the actual outcome (a walk) was better than the perceived alternative (a strikeout).

Examples of counterfactual thinking affecting athletes have been seen in studies examining Olympic medalists. Research has shown that bronze medalists experience more positive feelings than silver medalists, even though silver medalists obviously performed better, because the most compelling comparison for bronze medalists is a fourth-place finish and not medaling at all – a downward counterfactual. Meanwhile, the most relevant comparison for silver medalists is winning the gold, leading to feelings of failure –an upward counterfactual. This might sound odd, but it is a real phenomenon.

When it comes to baseball, the counterfactual mindset that seems to diminish the value of a single can lead people in and around the game to think that singles are something that may need to be fixed or improved. Anecdotally, this has been present for years in baseball – teams try to tinker with a player’s swing or approach at the plate for the purpose of extracting more power and changing singles to extra-base hits. One cautionary aspect of upward counterfactuals is that they imply a clean cause and effect that may not always exist. Doing whatever you can to “fix” singles hitters or create more extra-base hits – moving to more of an uppercut swing to increase your launch angle, swinging harder, etc. – may not cause a hitter to become a slugging machine. And the attribution problem, too, exists for all types of hits. All of the messy variables that influence whether a batted ball is a single or not also influence the likelihood of extra-base hits – along with those pesky pitchers and defenses.

The effects of the psychological devaluation of singles could create new problems for offensive players. Hitting is not one-size-fits-all, as many players are finding out when facing shifting defenses and advanced pitching strategies. Pitchers and defenses are getting more creative and using more tools in the pursuit of run prevention. Offenses need to follow suit and advance techniques to create runs – expanding their offensive choices, not shrinking them by viewing a factually more positive event as less useful than a less valuable event. Selling out for extra bases or walks may not be the best approach for every hitter in every situation.

Faulty psychological comparisons and messy attributions that undermine the usefulness of singles in the eyes of players and organizations may be diminishing the means through which teams can create runs. While the psychology behind attribution theory and counterfactual thinking may be working to help offenses embrace walks as a weapon, diminishing the positive view and usefulness of the single in today’s game may have offenses playing right into the hands of pitchers, defenses, and run prevention strategists.

References & Resources

Miller, Jeff. “Walks continue to pile up for Angels’ Mike Trout.” Los Angeles Times , July 25, 2018.

Kerr, Byron. “Scott Boras on why it has been a tough season so far for Bryce Harper.” MASN Sports, July 4, 2018.

Shusterman, Jordan. “Tim Anderson drew a walk, and he wants you to know it’s a big deal.” Cut4, April 6, 2018.

Greenstein, Teddy. “Anthony Rizzo’s 13-pitch at-bat flips the script in Cubs’ 3-2 victory over Nationals.” Chicago Tribune, August 10, 2018.

Boeck, Scott. “In launch-angle era, Dee Gordon lonely at the singles party: ‘One of the last guys left.'” USA Today, March 22, 2018.

Crasnick, Jerry. “MLB hitters explain why they can’t just beat the shift.” ESPN, July 10, 2018.

“Major League Baseball Batting Year-by-Year Averages.” Baseball Reference.

“wOBA and FIP Constants.” FanGraphs. Judge, Jonathan. “Why DRC+.” Baseball Prospectus, December 3, 2018.

Heider, Fritz. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Hoboken, NJ, US: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1958.

Kelley, H. H. “Attribution theory in social psychology.” Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 15: 192-238, 1967.

Weiner, B. “An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion.” Psychological Review 92(4): 548-573, 1985.

Carleton, Russell. “Baseball Therapy: It’s a Small Sample Size After All.” Baseball Prospectus, July 16, 2012.

Epstude, Kai, and Roese, Neal J. “The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking.” Personality and Social Psychological Review 12(2): 168–192.

Medvec, V. H., Madey, S. F., & Gilovich, T. “When less is more: Counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69(4): 603-610, 1995.

Thurrott, Stephanie. “Want to be happier? Think like a bronze medalist.” NBC News, February 15, 2018.