The virtual 1961 Cleveland Indians (Part 2)
Last time we identified a sequence of transactions executed by Cleveland GM Frank Lane between June 1958 and October 1960, and posed the question as to what sort of ball club the Indians might have had if they’d simply not made any of those deals. This time, we’ll find out the answer.
The developing ball club
The first trade we encountered was the lamentable dispatch of young Roger Maris in mid-1958. His subsequent development was swift and sure: Maris was very good in 1959 and terrific in 1960, winning a Gold Glove and the first of back-to-back MVP awards. In our scenario he’s doing that blossoming in an Indians uniform, while continuing to play center field, as he actually did in Cleveland in 1957-58. (Maris would spend significant time in center field through 1964).
Maris would be playing center instead of right because, of course, our Indians didn’t trade away their cannon-armed right fielder Rocky Colavito. In 1960 this pair would emerge as one of the most lethal back-to-back home run threats in the game.
But they weren’t the only two young power hitters Lane dealt away. Norm Cash and Gordy Coleman, both the same age as Maris, wielded potent left-handed bats. In our scenario they would compete for first base and left field playing time in 1960 with yet another strong lefty hitter who actually did blossom in Cleveland in this period: Tito Francona.
Our Indians exercise the patience to allow right-handed power producer Earl Averill to emerge and contribute. While best-suited for catching duty, in this scenario Averill would play mostly third base, because in 1960 an even better young right-handed power-hitting catcher, John Romano, arrived in Cleveland as part of the deal that delivered Cash.
Only in the middle infield did the actual Indians have better options than our version. Woodie Held was a first-rate offensive shortstop, but he’d been acquired in exchange for Maris, so we don’t have him. And at second base Cleveland had the veteran Johnny Temple, past his prime but still capable; but like Held, he was picked up in a deal we didn’t make. So our Indians have to settle for two farm system products at the keystone: young shortstop Mike de la Hoz, not much with the glove but swinging a better bat than many middle infielders, and smooth-fielding second baseman Billy Moran, who struggled at the plate until 1961.
On the mound, the Indians in this period featured quite a few impressive young arms. However, they lacked an ace at the top of the staff, and also could have used more depth at the bottom. In our scenario, veteran southpaw Don Mossi, though not quite a bellwether, remains in Cleveland to provide consistent effectiveness as the rotation anchor, while veteran knuckleballer Hoyt Wilhelm remains in Cleveland to serve as one of the premier relief aces in the game. Moreover, veteran right hander Cal McLish had been surrendered along with Gordy Coleman as part of the Johnny Temple deal, and since we didn’t make that trade McLish is on hand to further solidify the staff.
The 1961 season
The big story of that well-remembered year was of course Maris, who built upon his 1960 MVP performance with a sensational season-long home run spree. The media attention focused almost entirely upon Maris and his great Yankee teammate Mickey Mantle; that record-chasing drama crowded out of the spotlight an even more robust all-around hitting performance taking place in Detroit, where Norm Cash was suddenly channeling Ted Williams. The good news for us is that Maris and Cash are now both in Cleveland. Deal with that, media!
It gets better, as we also have Colavito as an Indian instead of a Tiger, and delivering a superb season. This phenomenal power trio would be abundantly supported by several additional solid hitters jostling for playing time.
Our Cleveland pitching isn’t nearly as spectacular as the hitting, but with Mossi topping a deep starting staff and Wilhelm brilliantly heading up the bullpen, it’s rock-solid.
The most common starting lineup would likely be:
1. de la Hoz, ss
2. Cash, lf
3. Colavito, rf
4. Maris, cf
5. Romano, c
6. Coleman, 1b
7. Averill, 3b
8. Moran, 2b
9. pitcher
The results
Pos Player Age G AB R H 2B 3B HR RBI BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS OPS+ 1B G. Coleman* 26 119 347 46 98 17 3 17 53 33 45 .282 .345 .496 .840 125 2B B. Moran 27 154 586 65 154 25 3 8 54 44 60 .263 .314 .357 .671 82 SS M. de la Hoz 22 139 522 81 134 27 2 13 44 25 51 .257 .291 .389 .680 83 3B-C E. Averill 29 144 509 67 124 19 0 22 78 85 109 .244 .352 .411 .762 106 RF R. Colavito 27 161 583 126 164 29 2 44 135 109 76 .281 .395 .564 .959 157 CF-LF R. Maris* 26 159 575 121 156 16 4 59 147 108 66 .271 .387 .621 1.007 169 LF-1B N. Cash* 26 154 535 134 188 21 7 40 97 109 86 .351 .461 .641 1.102 196 C J. Romano 26 142 509 79 152 29 1 21 86 61 60 .299 .374 .483 .857 131 LF-1B T. Francona* 27 103 296 44 87 14 4 8 34 27 27 .294 .353 .449 .802 116 3B B. Phillips 33 72 191 20 49 7 0 5 21 9 23 .257 .290 .372 .662 78 CF-LF J. Piersall 31 81 161 27 48 8 2 2 13 13 17 .298 .351 .410 .761 106 SS-2B R. Bridges 33 76 153 13 35 3 1 1 10 18 25 .229 .310 .281 .591 62 SS-3B J. Kubiszyn 24 38 72 6 14 1 0 1 1 5 9 .194 .247 .250 .497 35 C V. Thomas 32 18 43 4 9 2 0 1 3 3 4 .209 .261 .326 .586 58 Others 33 6 7 2 0 1 3 5 5 .212 .316 .364 .679 84 Pitchers 417 30 63 7 1 2 25 19 143 .151 .188 .187 .375 2 Total 5532 869 1482 227 30 245 804 673 806 .268 .347 .452 .800 115 * Bats left-handed Pitcher Age G GS CG IP W L SV H HR BB SO ERA ERA+ D. Mossi* 32 35 34 12 240 16 7 1 232 27 47 137 2.81 140 G. Bell 24 36 25 8 183 12 8 0 168 24 77 134 3.80 104 M. Grant 25 38 20 5 168 13 4 0 138 20 71 105 3.54 111 J. Perry 25 32 27 4 163 9 9 0 169 19 58 68 4.36 90 C. McLish 35 31 27 4 162 13 9 1 175 19 42 78 4.22 93 B. Latman 25 37 19 3 150 11 3 3 135 17 42 94 3.85 102 H. Wilhelm 38 51 1 0 110 11 4 21 88 5 43 89 2.30 171 F. Funk 25 56 0 0 92 11 8 12 79 8 30 64 3.23 122 D. Stigman* 25 24 5 0 64 3 3 0 65 8 24 48 4.50 88 B. Locke 27 22 2 0 48 3 1 1 50 5 18 21 4.31 91 B. Allen* 23 32 0 0 41 2 1 2 43 3 18 25 3.51 112 Others 10 2 0 22 0 1 0 17 1 13 14 2.37 166 Total 162 36 1443 104 58 41 1359 156 483 877 3.58 110 * Throws left-handed
Now, de la Hoz and his .291 OBP would be a poor excuse for a leadoff hitter, but it’s hard to imagine in those days (or even these days) a manager just saying the hell with it, and going with Cash-Colavito-Maris at the top of the order. And at the end of the day it wouldn’t make that much difference: Those three back-to-back-to-back at any point in the game were going to be an unsolvable problem for opponents, especially when followed by the steady bats of Romano, Coleman and Averill, with Francona in reserve for good measure. This offense would lead the league in runs scored by a very wide margin, and it wouldn’t be the 1961 Yankees setting a new major league record for team home runs with 240, but instead the 1961 Indians, with 245.
This outfield is so talent-laden that 31-year-old Jimmy Piersall, a Gold Glove center fielder that season who batted .322, is here reduced to scrapping for playing time as a fill-in and defensive replacement.
A disappointing year from 25-year-old right hander Jim Perry, who’d appeared headed for stardom in 1959-60, would be the only dark cloud on the pitching horizon. Despite placing only one qualifier (Mossi) in the league’s top 10 in ERA, top-to-bottom this staff would place third-best in the league in that category. Only the Orioles (even without Wilhelm) and Yankees would allow fewer runs.
Speaking of the Yankees: Would this Cleveland team have eclipsed them to capture the AL pennant? We have the Indians here achieving a record of 104-58, their Pythagorean performance (869 runs scored and 650 allowed).
Remember that those “M&M” 1961 Yankees went 109-53, leaving a terrific Detroit team (that prominently included Cash, Colavito and Mossi) in the dust down the stretch. Obviously in our scenario the Tigers would be decimated, but the Yankees would be just the “M” boys, as we have Maris in a Cleveland uniform.
In place of Maris, it’s logical to assume the Yankees would be deploying Norm Siebern, the key player whom they’d traded to Kansas City to acquire Maris in 1959. Siebern was no Maris, of course, but he was a very fine ballplayer. Win Shares estimates that Maris earned a little over four more wins for his team than Siebern in 1961; WARP has it as about a five-and-a-half-win advantage for Maris. Thus if we substitute Siebern’s performance for Maris’s, via Win Shares we can estimate a Yankee record of 105-57 (barely nosing out these Indians), while via WARP our estimate drops the Yankees to either 104-58 (a dead heat) or 103-59 (giving it to Cleveland in a photo finish). Any of these scenarios renders the race excruciatingly close.
But another point to consider is that the actual 1961 Yankees significantly outperformed their Pythagorean estimate, which has them at 103-59. If we allow our Indians to overperform Pythag to the degree the actual Yankees did, our Indians jump up to 110-52, and meanwhile the Pythag of these Maris-less Yankees has them falling short of 100 wins.
All in all, it’s fair to say that this hypothetical Cleveland ball club is better than the Siebern-in-place-of-Maris 1961 Yankees, so probably these Indians would have won the pennant. But it’s also realistic to say that the best team doesn’t always win a close race, and so the Mickey-and-Norm Yanks might have pulled this one out after all. In either case, one can easily imagine the 1961 American League race as an extravaganza: the Indians and Yanks battling it out for the flag, paced by the sensational offensive heroics of Maris and Cash in Cleveland and Mantle in New York, with the added attraction of Maris and Mantle competing to beat Babe Ruth’s beloved 60-home run mark.
On that final issue, with our Maris having to face the Yankees’ first-rate pitching 18 times, instead of the actual so-so Cleveland staff, my estimate has the young slugger falling just short of the record, with 59 taters. How might that bittersweet result have been perceived by the media and fans? Might Maris have been popularly embraced as a gallant competitor, instead of rejected as an unworthy usurper?
The legacy
Perhaps a Maris less bedeviled by New York media over those final pressure-packed weeks of the 1961 season, and not booed by his hometown fans beginning in 1962, would have held up more stoutly in the years to follow. But perhaps not; while the conventional wisdom invokes a cause-and-effect relationship between Maris’ stressful New York experience and his early breakdown and decline, the fact is that many outstanding young players blithely ignored by the New York media and fans have suffered early breakdown and decline. That might have been Maris’ fate even if he and the Yankees had never heard of one another.
And Maris wasn’t alone in peaking in 1961. The tremendous ’61 presented by Norm Cash would prove to be one of the most puzzling fluke seasons in history; while he remained an outstanding performer for a decade, Cash would never have another year remotely close to that one. Moreover, Rocky Colavito was just 27 in 1961, but he too would never produce another year as good, and like Maris he wouldn’t make it to the age of 35 as a major leaguer.
Indeed, few of the key players on this Cleveland ball club would have their careers play out as it seemed they would. John Romano and Gordy Coleman, both 26 in 1961, and Tito Francona, 27, were producing as stars (Romano and Francona were on the AL All-Star team), but just two years later, all three would see their batting averages plummet below .250, and their careers were at sudden difficult crossroads. Just one player on our hypothetical Indians roster would sustain consistent success through the entire 1960s, and he was the one for whom absolutely no one predicted it: 38-year-old Hoyt Wilhelm.
So this great 1961 performance would clearly be the high point for our Indians. Whether they won the ’61 pennant or not, they probably wouldn’t have followed up with championships. Still, the Tribe of ’61 would have been greatly celebrated at the time, and would be well-remembered today, as among the most robust ball clubs of that or any era, a powerhouse for the ages.
Oh, Frankie, Frankie, Frankie.
A great, well-written, analusis of what might have been.
Maris, Colavito, Cash, and Romano could have been aligned. And by win shares, I think their 1961 seasons might total higher than any four teammates except Combs, Lazzeri, Ruth, and Gehrig of the 1927 Murderers’ Row.
Trading surplus OF talent for infield/pitching help would have made perfect sense. But remember what my self-imposed limitations are in this exercise: I can’t invent any transaction that wasn’t actually made, I can only suppress transactions that were.
As for Herb Score: yes, it would be marvelous for the Indians if he’d never been struck by the line drive and had played out his full career unhurt. However, my gut tells me that he was probably going to encounter arm trouble at some point anyway, quite likely by 1961.
If you just allow the baseball gods to deflect slightly the fateful McDougald line drive, leaving and HOF Herb Score in the rotation with all that mix, WOW!
Indians’ manager Joe Gordon speaking to GM Steve Treder: Steve, as a former infielder myself, I would have to ask to do something the middle infield. And as for Piersall, if I can’t play him regularly, he will be an unstable force in the clubhouse. Fear may not have struck out yet, it may still be hitting foul balls. Now (off-season ‘60-‘61) might be the time to trade some of our outfield and pitching depth to improve the balance up the middle. Keep Maris and Colavito, Cash is not a natural outfielder. I would play Piersall in CF. Cash and/or Francona and/or a pitcher could be tradeable. Get some good middle infield help in return. Frankie was crazy, but you can’t stand pat completely. Also, good lumber at bat is good, but do we have to have complete lumbering on the bases as well?
Frank Lane was at one time with the Chisox a great general manager then came St. Louis and big doubts when he got to Cleveland the magic was gone. all his world became making a deal, which were bad deals. Colavito for Kuenn,Kuenn for Kirkland—-need further proof.