To Go or Not to Go?
“Baseball is a kind of collective chess with arms and legs in full play under sunlight.” – Jacques Barzun from God’s Country and Mine
Recently I was looking through some data as a favor for our friends over at the excellent site Nats Blog, and I ran into a few interesting tidbits I thought I’d trot out this week.
The topic is sacrifice flies, so this also provides a segue with John Walsh’s recent articles “Do Batters Try to Hit Sacrifice Flies?” and “Can Batters Successfully Modify Their Batting Approach?” as well as my recent articles “Not So Sweet Surrender” and “Sacrificing in 2005 Redux.”
In a nutshell, what I was looking at was how the success rate changes for sacrifice flies when the batter hits the ball to the three outfield positions. In other words, how much more likely is a runner to tag and score when the fly ball is caught by a left or right fielder as opposed to a center fielder?
To Go or Not to Go
To look at this question I used the 2003-2005 play-by-play data and examined the results of all 4,950 fly balls that were hit with a runner on third and fewer than two outs that did not result in either a hit or a dropped-ball error on the outfielder. (This includes throwing errors.) Breaking the results down by the position that caught the fly ball you find the following:
Position Opp Hold Hold% Scores DP DP% Succ%
LF 1467 293 0.200 1119 55 0.037 0.953
CF 1910 225 0.118 1632 53 0.028 0.969
RF 1573 318 0.202 1197 58 0.037 0.954
4950 836 0.169 3948 166 0.034 0.960
Here, the Opportunities are the number of fly balls, Hold% represents the percentage of time the runner stayed on third, and the Succ% the percentage of times the runner scored when sent.
So when a fly ball is hit to the center fielder, the runner tags about 9% more often than when the ball is caught by either of the corner outfielders. Runners are also more successful by about 1.5% when the ball is in the hands of the center fielder. Overall, though, when a runner is sent, he makes it more than 19 times out of 20 regardless of who catches it.
A conclusion one might draw from this is that third base coaches are more cautious when the ball is hit to the corners both because some corner outfielders (Ichiro Suzuki comes to mind) have better arms but probably more likely because the ball is simply closer to the plate when caught by a corner outfielder. Alas I don’t have distance data to confirm just what the mix of these two factors might be.
So far so good and pretty much what we’d expect.
What surprised me a little was when I looked at the data broken down by the number of outs.
Outs Opp Hold Hold% Scores DP DP% Succ% 0 1387 257 0.185 1097 33 0.024 0.971 1 3563 579 0.163 2851 133 0.037 0.955
Here what you’ll notice is that runners were sent from third 81.5% of the time (1-.185) with nobody out and 83.7% of the time with one out. While this difference moves in the direction you’d expect, with more runners being sent and more being caught with one out than with nobody out, what surprised me is that the difference was not larger, since “the book” would tell you that it is a far worse error to get a runner thrown out as the second out of an inning than as the third.
This conclusion is easy to see when you apply Run Expectancy and Scoring Probability matrices to the question. Yes, I realize that these matrices are not that useful when analyzing very specific situations, because the values are affected by the context which includes the batter, pitcher, fielders, score, lineup, park, weather and what the umpire had to eat before the game. But here we’re talking about the general application of a strategy using aggregate data, so I think we’re on more solid ground.
In any case, using the Run Expectancy and Scoring Probability tables you can access on Tangotiger’s site and the break-even formula I described in my first article on bunting, you can make some simple estimates as to when it makes sense for a third base coach to send his runner. For example, when there is a runner only on third with nobody out, the calculation indicates that the coach should only send the runner if he’s certain the runner will make it when the goal is to maximize runs. However, if his aim is to score a single run (i.e. when that run will tie or win the game), the coach should send the runner if he thinks the runner’s odds of making it are greater than around 85%. With one out the needed probability of success drops to 88% and 66% respectively.
Of course the calculation also changes when there are other runners on base. For example, with runners on first and third and one out, the needed probability of success to maximize runs increases to 92.4%.
Because of the relatively wide difference between these strategic tipping points and the data indicating that runners are actually successful 95-97% of the time, I thought that perhaps the Hold% would change when examining the data by score differential and reveal that indeed third base coaches took more risks when down by a run or with the game tied.
Score Diff Opp Hold Hold% Scores DP DP% Succ% >=-5 353 70 0.198 274 9 0.025 0.968 -4 188 25 0.133 161 2 0.011 0.988 -3 273 43 0.158 225 5 0.018 0.978 -2 396 83 0.210 298 15 0.038 0.952 -1 576 102 0.177 447 27 0.047 0.943 0 1131 186 0.164 904 41 0.036 0.957 1 639 103 0.161 518 18 0.028 0.966 2 458 78 0.170 360 20 0.044 0.947 3 320 53 0.166 258 9 0.028 0.966 4 239 31 0.130 198 10 0.042 0.952 >=5 377 62 0.164 305 10 0.027 0.968
As you can see, when looking at the Hold% there really is no discernable pattern that would indicate that third base coaches are more aggressive in some situations than others, although when down by a run the Success% but not the Hold% does drops a bit to 94.3%.
To summarize the point, when you compare the needed scoring probability using the matrices with what actually happens, it would appear that third base coaches only send runners when they are virtually certain they’ll make it. We can infer this because if they took more risks we would likely see lower success rates. The point becomes even stronger when you recall that errors aren’t included in these statistics. This behavior, from a strategic perspective anyway, is suboptimal. Chalk it up to the human propensity to be risk averse.
Intimidation
As mentioned previously, one reason third base coaches might be more reticent about sending the runner is related to the strength of the arms in the outfield. Because of this, as many baseball fans are well aware, the mark of a great outfield arm is usually not how many assists a player racks up but rather how few times an opposing team challenges his arm.
This axiom is particularly applicable to sacrifice fly opportunities, so I also took a quick look at the data broken down by the fielder who caught the fly ball. The following table shows the top 20 corner outfielders with 15 or more opportunities sorted by Hold%. In other words, this might give us an indication of which arms are most feared.
Name POS Opp Hold Hold% Scores DP DP% Succ% Brad Wilkerson LF 20 9 0.450 8 3 0.150 0.727 Craig Monroe RF 24 10 0.417 13 1 0.042 0.929 Danny Bautista RF 23 9 0.391 14 0 0.000 1.000 Ichiro Suzuki RF 59 22 0.373 33 4 0.068 0.892 Raul Mondesi RF 19 7 0.368 11 1 0.053 0.917 Jose Guillen RF 25 9 0.360 15 1 0.040 0.938 Jose Guillen LF 17 6 0.353 10 1 0.059 0.909 Luis Gonzalez LF 32 11 0.344 20 1 0.031 0.952 Geoff Jenkins RF 15 5 0.333 7 3 0.200 0.700 Terrence Long LF 16 5 0.313 11 0 0.000 1.000 Matt Lawton LF 16 5 0.313 11 0 0.000 1.000 Trot Nixon RF 33 10 0.303 23 0 0.000 1.000 Manny Ramirez LF 41 12 0.293 29 0 0.000 1.000 Raul Ibanez LF 41 12 0.293 26 3 0.073 0.897 Jacque Jones RF 24 7 0.292 17 0 0.000 1.000 Geoff Jenkins LF 21 6 0.286 13 2 0.095 0.867 Jeromy Burnitz RF 25 7 0.280 18 0 0.000 1.000 Juan EncarnacionRF 43 12 0.279 30 1 0.023 0.968 Kevin Mench LF 18 5 0.278 12 1 0.056 0.923 Brian Giles RF 29 8 0.276 19 2 0.069 0.905
This list tracks fairly well with the word on the street since Brad Wilkerson, Danny Bautista, Ichiro Suzuki, Raul Mondesi and Jose Guillen are all reported to have strong arms. On the other side of the coin Austin Kearns and Reed Johnson have the distinction of never having a coach hold his runner in 24 and 16 opportunities respectively. Other “poor arms” noted here were Jason Bay (one hold in 29 opp), Brady Clark (2-27), Shannon Stewart (2-27), Rondell White (3-30) and Carl Crawford (5-46).
And here are the top center fielders.
Name POS Opp Hold Hold% Scores DP DP% Succ% Torii Hunter CF 40 12 0.300 26 2 0.050 0.929 Jay Payton CF 25 6 0.240 18 1 0.040 0.947 Kenny Lofton CF 38 9 0.237 27 2 0.053 0.931 Wily Mo Pena CF 19 4 0.211 15 0 0.000 1.000 Luis Matos CF 41 8 0.195 31 2 0.049 0.939 Gary Matthews CF 31 6 0.194 25 0 0.000 1.000 Mike Cameron CF 38 7 0.184 31 0 0.000 1.000 Scott Podsednik CF 40 7 0.175 33 0 0.000 1.000 Aaron Rowand CF 41 7 0.171 34 0 0.000 1.000 Andruw Jones CF 53 9 0.170 42 2 0.038 0.955 Brady Clark CF 18 3 0.167 15 0 0.000 1.000 Milton Bradley CF 37 6 0.162 29 2 0.054 0.935 David DeJesus CF 31 5 0.161 26 0 0.000 1.000 Jim Edmonds CF 56 9 0.161 44 3 0.054 0.936 Alex Sanchez CF 33 5 0.152 28 0 0.000 1.000 Rocco Baldelli CF 47 7 0.149 37 3 0.064 0.925 Brad Wilkerson CF 27 4 0.148 22 1 0.037 0.957 Carlos Beltran CF 69 9 0.130 59 1 0.014 0.983 Marlon Byrd CF 18 2 0.111 16 0 0.000 1.000 Endy Chavez CF 18 2 0.111 14 2 0.111 0.875
On the bottom of the pile we find Marquis Grissom and Bernie Williams who were run against in every one of their 38 and 43 opportunities. Nook Logon (1-25), Randy Winn (1-24) and Jeremy Reed (1-20) also bring up the rear.
It should be noted that park effects aren’t taken into account here, so left fielders like Manny Ramirez and Moises Alou may be benefiting from a small left field area, while Hideki Matsui is likely being penalized. In addition, because we don’t have distance data, there are some outfielders who were probably unlucky in the sense that they happened to catch more than their share of long fly balls in these situations when they have no chance of throwing out the runner.
The fielders can also be ranked by their ability to throw out the runner, so here are the top 10 corner outfielders in Succ%:
Name POS Opp Hold Hold% Scores DP DP% Succ% Geoff Jenkins RF 15 5 0.333 7 3 0.200 0.700 Brad Wilkerson LF 20 9 0.450 8 3 0.150 0.727 Miguel Cabrera LF 28 4 0.143 20 4 0.143 0.833 Richard Hidalgo RF 38 10 0.263 24 4 0.105 0.857 Alexis Rios RF 30 8 0.267 19 3 0.100 0.864 Geoff Jenkins LF 21 6 0.286 13 2 0.095 0.867 Ichiro Suzuki RF 59 22 0.373 33 4 0.068 0.892 Eric Byrnes LF 24 5 0.208 17 2 0.083 0.895 Raul Ibanez LF 41 12 0.293 26 3 0.073 0.897 Brian Giles RF 29 8 0.276 19 2 0.069 0.905
And the center fielders:
Name POS Opp Hold Hold% Scores DP DP% Succ% Endy Chavez CF 18 2 0.111 14 2 0.111 0.875 Randy Winn CF 24 1 0.042 21 2 0.083 0.913 Mark Kotsay CF 54 5 0.093 45 4 0.074 0.918 Rocco Baldelli CF 47 7 0.149 37 3 0.064 0.925 Steve Finley CF 43 3 0.070 37 3 0.070 0.925 Torii Hunter CF 40 12 0.300 26 2 0.050 0.929 Kenny Lofton CF 38 9 0.237 27 2 0.053 0.931 Milton Bradley CF 37 6 0.162 29 2 0.054 0.935 Jim Edmonds CF 56 9 0.161 44 3 0.054 0.936 Luis Matos CF 41 8 0.195 31 2 0.049 0.939
Of course small sample size warnings apply to these lists since it only takes a couple of good throws to drive down the Succ%.