Whither the Closer? Part One
The “Closer” is the term applied to the modern relief pitcher primarily deployed to finish games with close leads. In recent years, the practice of designating one reliever per team to fulfill this role in a specialized manner has become essentially orthodox: every team either has such a pitcher, or is ardently searching to find a new one, and the period in which they don’t have a clearly designated Closer is unquestioningly regarded as a problem bordering on crisis.
In 2004, the mean average performance of the pitcher from all 30 major league teams who recorded the most Saves for his team — in other words, the Closer — was as follows:
G IP IP/G W L Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 62 66 1.08 3 4 31 50.1% 75.2% 160
We see that the average Closer in 2004 appeared in 62 games, working a shade over one inning per appearance. He got very few Win or Loss decisions, but was credited with 31 Saves — a Save in half his appearances. This Save total amounted to about three-quarters of his team’s total Saves, and this Closer’s ERA was about 60% better than the league-average ERA, normalized for Park Factor.
Let’s pose two questions regarding the stat line of this typical Closer:
1. Is this usage pattern a sensible, optimal way to deploy what is almost always the most highly skilled (and certainly highest-paid) pitcher in the bullpen?
2. Will we be seeing a similar stat line from the key reliever in the average bullpen 10 years from now, or 20 years from now? If not, how might the usage pattern differ from this one?
In order to answer both of these questions, it’s necessary for us to take a step back and understand how we got to the situation we found in 2004. This Closer role, after all, despite its near-universal application today, hasn’t always existed, and is in fact a very recent innovation.
The modern bullpen, and particularly the Closer, can be seen as the fourth phase in the evolution of bullpen deployment that has occurred over the past 40 or 50 years. Why don’t we review that evolution?
Phase I: The Era of the Fireman
Let’s take a look at the mean average stats of the pitcher recording the most Saves in every team’s bullpen for the years 1960 through 1972.
Average Top Save Producer, 1960-1972:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1960 54 97 1.80 7 5 12.4 13 23.3% 46.7% 103 1961 54 96 1.79 7 7 13.6 13 23.9% 46.3% 116 1962 53 87 1.65 6 6 12.3 13 24.8% 42.2% 140 1963 56 103 1.82 7 6 13.3 16 28.5% 54.3% 131 1964 59 98 1.66 7 6 12.6 17 28.6% 50.4% 142 1965 61 100 1.65 7 6 13.1 18 30.1% 54.0% 141 1966 57 96 1.68 7 6 12.3 16 27.5% 47.2% 134 1967 56 96 1.72 6 6 12.3 15 26.5% 45.9% 144 1968 52 86 1.64 6 5 10.5 13 24.8% 43.4% 121 1969 59 98 1.66 7 6 13.5 16 26.4% 50.2% 125 1970 60 91 1.52 6 6 12.0 19 31.9% 52.5% 135 1971 55 90 1.65 6 6 11.8 15 27.6% 52.5% 128 1972 53 84 1.59 6 6 11.5 17 31.3% 51.7% 125 Avg 56 94 1.68 7 6 12.4 15 27.4% 49.0% 130
Through the decade of the 1950s, the deployment of the relief pitching specialist gained increasing prominence. This role was different from most previous bullpenners, in that it wasn’t just an erstwhile starter filling in, and wasn’t just a belly-itcher mopping up, but was instead a good pitcher used regularly and exclusively (or nearly so) in the relief role, and regularly called upon to deal with the most high-pressure, high-leverage situations. This save-the-day, douse-the-flames duty led to the role becoming known as the “Fireman;” the award for best relief pitcher was called the Fireman of the Year.
The Fireman was certainly called upon to get Saves, including one-inning Saves. But that wasn’t his sole or even primary purpose. Usually he was brought in before the ninth inning, typically the eighth but often the seventh. His stint was more likely to be two innings than one, and it wasn’t all that rare (especially in extra-inning games) to be as extensive as three or four innings. He was used to protect leads, but was also commonly called upon in tie games, or even sometimes when his team was down by a run or two. Compared with the Closer, the Fireman was typically deployed in slightly fewer games, significantly more innings, and in a much less tightly bound range of circumstances.
By 1960, the Fireman had passed through its period of being an alternative used by some teams, and was now a staple, an expected element in every team’s bullpen. The role was so firmly established that, as we can see, across the decade of the 1960s, there was a great deal of stability in its profile. But looking closely, we can see some very gradual shifts in the usage pattern. In the early ’60s, Firemen tended to work around 1.7 or 1.8 innings per appearance; by the early ’70s they were down to about 1.6. Early on they were picking up Saves less than 25% of the time; by the end of the period it was around 30%. These Saves typically represented a bit less than half of the team’s total in the early 1960s, and a decade later they were generally a bit more than half.
This was the usage pattern of the average 1960s Fireman. But in implementing this role, managers were doing their best to replicate the results achieved by the very best Firemen. How different was the typical Fireman from the best in class? Let’s take a look at the line put up by the top one-fifth of all Firemen. As defined by the highest total of Wins plus Saves, here is the mean average of the top 3 Firemen from 1960 (among 16 teams), top 4 from 1961 through 1968 (among 18 and then 20 teams), and top 5 from 1969 through 1972 (among 24 teams).
Top Quintile Win Plus Save Producer, 1960-1972:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1960 68 113 1.67 11 6 16.3 21 31.5% 74.4% 159 1961 58 108 1.86 12 5 17.3 20 34.5% 56.3% 154 1962 62 99 1.60 8 6 13.5 23 36.4% 53.3% 160 1963 66 115 1.76 12 6 18.3 24 36.1% 72.0% 163 1964 69 119 1.72 11 7 17.8 25 36.6% 65.6% 161 1965 77 130 1.69 10 7 16.5 27 35.2% 63.9% 148 1966 62 99 1.60 9 4 12.5 24 38.6% 61.9% 153 1967 70 112 1.60 9 6 14.8 24 34.1% 56.5% 176 1968 65 114 1.75 10 7 16.0 19 28.7% 52.8% 160 1969 66 106 1.61 7 6 13.0 27 41.3% 67.3% 155 1970 65 99 1.53 7 6 13.0 30 46.7% 60.6% 140 1971 66 105 1.58 8 8 15.8 24 36.4% 69.1% 143 1972 64 110 1.72 9 6 14.8 31 47.9% 71.2% 166 Avg 66 110 1.67 9 6 15.3 24 37.2% 63.5% 157
These were the best relief pitchers in baseball, of course. In the early 1960s this group typically included Lindy McDaniel, Elroy Face, Stu Miller, and of course Hall of Famer Hoyt Wilhelm. In the middle of the period along came Dick Radatz, Ted Abernathy, and Phil Regan, and toward the end the prominent names included Wilbur Wood, Jim Brewer, and Dave Giusti. One great Fireman over nearly the whole era was Ron Perranoski.
The typical stint length of this elite corps remained quite steady over the period. But a subtle development can be discerned: toward the later years, these Firemen were recording slightly fewer Win/Loss decisions, and quite a few more Saves.
Phase II: The Golden Age of the Ace Reliever
In the mid-1970s, the slight trend that had been developing toward shorter stints by Firemen suddenly reversed. Top relievers, despite working as often as ever, pushed the innings pitched boundary up to levels never seen before.
Average Top Save Producer, 1973-1985:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1973 55 97 1.77 6 6 12.0 17 30.2% 48.7% 137 1974 59 106 1.80 7 6 13.2 13 21.4% 58.2% 131 1975 53 88 1.66 6 6 11.6 14 26.2% 49.6% 130 1976 58 99 1.71 7 6 13.2 14 24.9% 50.5% 130 1977 61 106 1.75 8 7 14.2 18 29.0% 54.1% 144 1978 58 94 1.62 7 7 14.5 18 31.3% 58.8% 137 1979 57 95 1.65 7 7 14.1 18 30.7% 54.3% 160 1980 62 97 1.56 6 6 12.4 19 30.8% 55.4% 147 1981 62 100 1.61 7 6 12.7 19 30.7% 54.7% 157 1982 61 101 1.64 7 7 13.8 20 31.9% 54.6% 136 1983 60 93 1.56 6 7 13.0 20 33.3% 52.9% 144 1984 61 91 1.49 6 7 12.6 22 36.2% 57.4% 135 1985 61 91 1.49 6 6 12.7 22 36.3% 58.9% 139 Avg 59 97 1.64 7 6 13.1 18 30.3% 54.5% 140
The reversal in the stint-length trend only lasted for a few years. By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, it drifted back downward, and in 1984 and 1985 average innings/game dropped below 1.5 for the first time. Corresponding with this was a slight but unmistakable trend toward more Saves for this reliever.
In this period the term “Fireman” became employed less frequently. The image of bailing the starter out of emergencies was gradually replaced by an image of a reliever whose use was expected, planned for, even desired. This reliever was assuming an ever-greater profile as a star. While he didn’t equal the status of the top starter — the staff Ace — he enjoyed a reputation as the next-best, and generally came to be called the Ace Reliever.
Top Quintile Win Plus Save Producer, 1973-1985:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1973 67 121 1.80 9 7 15.2 28 42.1% 68.1% 163 1974 74 147 1.99 12 10 21.4 19 25.9% 80.7% 141 1975 66 113 1.71 9 6 15.8 22 32.6% 54.3% 161 1976 72 131 1.82 12 7 19.4 21 29.7% 66.0% 146 1977 71 130 1.84 10 7 17.4 30 42.2% 74.1% 205 1978 70 115 1.64 8 9 17.4 30 42.3% 69.2% 156 1979 76 130 1.72 10 8 17.6 30 39.7% 72.1% 188 1980 67 109 1.62 10 7 16.4 28 41.7% 69.0% 131 1981 72 116 1.61 9 7 15.3 33 45.2% 73.2% 181 1982 72 115 1.61 10 8 17.2 31 43.7% 69.2% 165 1983 65 110 1.70 8 6 13.8 31 47.8% 76.4% 164 1984 72 118 1.64 8 5 13.0 38 52.8% 77.2% 166 1985 71 106 1.50 7 7 14.4 34 48.5% 76.8% 152 Avg 70 120 1.71 9 7 16.5 29 41.0% 71.2% 163
The mid-’70s extreme-workhorse-variety Ace Relievers were led by Mike Marshall, and also included John Hiller and Bill Campbell. But the 1970s also included two Ace Relievers who worked just slightly less, but with more effectiveness and consistency: Goose Gossage, and Hall of Famer Rollie Fingers. In the late ’70s the spectacular Bruce Sutter burst onto the scene, and into the early 1980s Sutter and Dan Quisenberry were the best.
Sutter’s dazzling 1977 performance, and his second-half injuries and struggles in both 1977 and ’78, led Cubs’ manager Herman Franks in 1979 to modify Sutter’s usage pattern to focus more on Save situations, a development we discussed last summer. This new mode — certainly not the modern Closer mode, but clearly a step toward it — wasn’t immediately imitated everywhere: Quisenberry, Kent Tekulve, Willie Hernandez and others continued to be deployed in full-out 1970s style, into the 1980s. But other Ace Relievers were used in a more tightly-defined, Save-oriented fashion, most notably Lee Smith and Jeff Reardon. By 1984-85, the best Ace Relievers were recording fewer innings per appearance, fewer Wins, and more Saves than ever before.
Phase III: The Transformation
For all the changes in reliever usage that occurred from 1960 to 1985, the typical Ace Reliever of the mid-1980s truly wasn’t all that different from the typical Fireman of a quarter-century earlier. But a metamorphosis was imminent.
Average Top Save Producer, 1986-1992:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1986 60 88 1.46 7 7 13.5 23 37.3% 58.3% 126 1987 57 85 1.49 5 6 11.0 20 35.0% 53.3% 148 1988 57 74 1.29 4 5 9.7 26 44.8% 63.9% 138 1989 59 74 1.24 4 4 8.4 27 46.1% 66.6% 157 1990 59 73 1.25 5 5 9.0 27 45.8% 62.6% 167 1991 60 70 1.17 4 5 8.7 27 44.8% 61.6% 150 1992 61 75 1.23 4 5 8.8 28 45.9% 65.5% 134 Avg 59 77 1.30 5 5 9.9 25 42.9% 61.7% 146
Within just a few years’ time, the profile of the typical top reliever changed more dramatically than it had in decades. Season by season, in rapid succession, Ace Relievers were asked to work fewer innings per stint, as their deployment became more and more focused on Save situations. Ever more rarely appearing in anything but close lead situations, they received fewer and fewer Win or Loss decisions, and ever more Saves.
It was in this period that the term “Closer” was coined. I don’t know where it originated, or exactly when. I seem to recall first becoming acquainted with it in 1989, when the Giants acquired Steve Bedrosian. But I just checked a couple of guidebooks I have from 1988 and 1989, and there is no use of the term, even when discussing the top Save collectors of the day. But in my books from 1991 and 1992, the label is being used widely, without any sense of self-consciousness.
What prompted the sudden change? There isn’t a simple easy answer to that question. The Closer revolution didn’t occur all by itself; as we saw last week, the late 1980s/early 1990s also witnessed an explosion in the engagement of very-short-stint tactics for left-handed relief specialists. The motivations for both transformations — which we will explore next time — weren’t exactly the same, but the two dynamics were clearly interdependent. For now, we’ll just say that the impulse driving the invention of the modern Closer was likely driven at least as much by considerations of injury prevention of highly-paid relief stars as by strictly in-game tactical advantages. Whether it fully rises to the level of “wagging the dog” is debatable, but there’s no reasonable way to ignore the issue that the economic reality of free agency baseball, as it passed its tenth birthday, was a factor in this dramatic alteration in the way the game was managed.
Top Quintile Win Plus Save Producer, 1986-1992:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1986 68 94 1.38 8 9 16.4 36 53.2% 77.4% 141 1987 66 89 1.35 7 6 12.6 34 52.1% 73.2% 148 1988 62 78 1.26 4 4 8.6 39 63.3% 78.5% 167 1989 65 77 1.18 5 4 9.2 37 56.0% 74.4% 187 1990 65 78 1.19 5 4 9.0 44 67.1% 82.9% 255 1991 67 77 1.16 6 4 10.0 42 62.5% 87.4% 177 1992 70 83 1.19 6 6 11.2 42 59.4% 83.5% 150 Avg 66 82 1.24 6 5 11.0 39 59.0% 79.6% 175
The single most influential reliever in the startling transformation was, of course, Hall of Famer Dennis Eckersley. But Jeff Reardon was also deployed in dramatically shorter stints as early as 1988 and 1989. There were still a few older-style Ace Relievers in the mix, such as Roger McDowell, Dave Righetti, and Doug Jones in some of their seasons, but the rush to adopt the new Closer pattern was sweeping everything in its path. Steve Bedrosian and Mark Davis winning Cy Young Awards in 1987 and 1989 in Save-primary usage modes, and then relative unknown Bobby Thigpen racking up the stunning total of 57 Saves in 1990, further energized the cycle. By the early ’90s, nearly all the best relievers in baseball — including Rick Aguilera, Bryan Harvey, and Gregg Olson — were locked into the Eckersley-like usage mode.
Phase IV: All Closer All the Time
The period since 1993 has been striking in three regards. First, obviously, is the strict limitation to short stints and only short stints for the newly-named Closer. By 1993, top relievers were working at least a half an inning per game less than they had been just a decade earlier. It suddenly became (and remains) unheard of for a Closer to ever, ever work more than two innings, and even entering the game in the middle of the eighth inning, and working a four-out or five-out Save opportunity, is now ballyhooed as an epic feat of endurance, as well as feared for the awful damage it’s presumed to wreak on the Closer’s health.
The second remarkable development is the degree to which this completely unprecedented pattern immediately stabilized. All previous 12-year periods of relief ace usage have demonstrated some degree of evolution, however gradual or subtle. But the Closer in the twelve seasons since 1993 has shown very little indication of developing in any new direction.
Third is the extraordinary extent to which the Closer has been adopted as the model that all teams have followed. In previous eras, there was always a certain amount of variation in the modes in which different teams deployed their Ace Reliever. But since 1993, the Closer model is universal; variations have been rare, minimal, and fleeting — though just within the past few seasons there have been a very few hints of orthodoxy-bucking, that we’ll explore next week.
Average Top Save Producer, 1993-2004:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1993 60 63 1.05 3 4 7.4 31 51.7% 72.2% 149 1994 59 64 1.09 4 5 9.3 25 43.4% 64.5% 135 1995 60 64 1.06 3 4 7.0 30 49.4% 73.5% 157 1996 63 68 1.09 4 5 8.1 30 47.2% 74.4% 146 1997 64 67 1.05 4 5 8.7 29 44.7% 70.4% 145 1998 62 68 1.09 4 5 8.0 31 49.1% 72.6% 163 1999 65 71 1.09 3 5 8.4 30 45.9% 73.2% 142 2000 63 69 1.10 4 4 8.2 29 45.3% 73.1% 147 2001 63 66 1.04 3 4 7.5 30 47.6% 75.0% 136 2002 64 70 1.08 4 4 7.8 33 51.3% 80.6% 147 2003 59 64 1.09 3 4 7.3 28 47.5% 70.1% 163 2004 62 66 1.08 3 4 6.7 31 50.1% 75.2% 160 Avg 62 67 1.08 4 4 7.9 30 47.8% 72.9% 149
The omnipresent application of the Closer model has resulted in one its perhaps more troubling aspects. While there is, as always, a lot of difference in the quality of performance between the best relievers in baseball and the rest, the strict boundaries in Closer usage protocol allow very little difference in the quantity of their usage. Everybody has one, and everybody uses him the same way as everyone else, with little regard to how effective he is.
Top Quintile Win Plus Save Producer, 1993-2004:
Year G IP IP/G W L Dec. Sv Sv/G Sv/T Sv ERA+ 1993 70 78 1.12 4 4 7.5 47 66.7% 89.1% 212 1994 66 71 1.08 3 6 8.8 40 61.4% 77.6% 154 1995 63 63 0.99 3 3 6.6 41 65.4% 90.6% 180 1996 69 76 1.09 5 4 9.0 41 59.4% 86.1% 173 1997 70 75 1.07 6 3 9.0 40 56.8% 83.6% 179 1998 71 75 1.05 4 4 8.5 46 64.0% 88.4% 201 1999 67 71 1.06 4 3 7.0 42 62.6% 90.6% 192 2000 71 73 1.04 4 5 8.5 42 60.0% 90.7% 172 2001 72 75 1.04 4 6 9.5 44 61.3% 90.2% 143 2002 73 78 1.07 5 4 8.5 48 65.2% 95.6% 151 2003 70 76 1.09 3 3 6.2 45 64.0% 89.0% 264 2004 70 75 1.07 4 3 6.7 47 67.8% 89.3% 208 Avg 69 74 1.06 4 4 8.0 44 62.9% 88.4% 186
As a result, we’ve witnessed an era in which several obviously great relief pitchers have recorded dazzling rate stats, yet have been strictly limited in their volume of annual contribution. No one doubts that the elite class of Closers over the past decade — which would certainly include Mariano Rivera, Trevor Hoffman, Eric Gagne, and John Smoltz — are every bit as dominating and effective as the best relievers in history, but it remains a very valid question as to whether they’ve generated as much value in any given season as many lesser talents did almost annually in the more expansive relief roles of the several prior decades.
Furthermore, there has been a generation of other relievers, fine pitchers though not in the super-elite category — the likes of John Wetteland, Rod Beck, Robb Nen, Armando Benitez, and Billy Wagner — who have been lauded as major stars, and rewarded with sumptuously lavish, superstar-worthy compensation, while rarely, if ever, facing more than 300-350 batters in a season. Whatever the wisdom of this development, its historical uniqueness is stark.
So Can We Consider Those Questions, Already?
Okay, okay. Yes, it’s time to consider them. (Answering them, well …) The two questions we presented way up top were:
1. Is this usage pattern a sensible, optimal way to deploy what is almost always the most highly skilled (and certainly highest-paid) pitcher in the bullpen?
and
2. Will we be seeing a similar stat line from the key reliever in the average bullpen 10 years from now, or 20 years from now? If not, how might the usage pattern differ from this one?
We will — you guessed it — attempt the task of constructing answers to these questions next time, when we’ll also (at last!) tie in the questions regarding the wisdom of LOOGY deployment that we raised over the past two weeks. The reason for drawing this whole thing out this way (other than, you know, simple procrastination) is hopefully being made clear: the Closer and the LOOGY are two inextricable elements of the same dynamic. Neither could exist quite as it does without the other.
In closing this time (please, no pun intended), as we ponder what the answers to these questions might be, let’s consider the implications of, and the interplay between, the following four factors since 1986: overall major league Saves per game, the percentage of those Saves garnered by each team’s top Save producer, overall major league Complete Games per game, and overall major league Runs per game.
Year Sv/G Sv/T Sv CG/G R/G 1986 23.9% 58.3% 13.8% 4.41 1987 23.1% 53.3% 13.3% 4.72 1988 25.0% 63.9% 14.8% 4.14 1989 25.4% 66.6% 11.5% 4.13 1990 26.4% 62.6% 10.2% 4.26 1991 26.9% 61.6% 8.7% 4.31 1992 26.3% 65.5% 9.9% 4.12 1993 26.3% 72.2% 8.2% 4.60 1994 24.3% 64.5% 8.0% 4.92 1995 24.9% 73.5% 6.8% 4.85 1996 24.6% 74.4% 6.4% 5.04 1997 25.1% 70.4% 5.9% 4.77 1998 26.0% 72.6% 6.2% 4.79 1999 25.1% 73.2% 4.9% 5.08 2000 24.2% 73.1% 4.8% 5.14 2001 24.9% 75.0% 4.1% 4.78 2002 25.2% 80.6% 4.4% 4.62 2003 24.7% 70.1% 4.3% 4.73 2004 25.3% 75.2% 3.1% 4.81
References & Resources
A couple of notes regarding methodology in compiling the stats of relievers:
– Putting together the aggregation of top Save producers, whenever two (or more) pitchers tied for their team lead in Saves, the stats of those pitchers was averaged for that team’s contribution to the major league average.
– Putting together the aggregation of top quintile Win plus Save producers, whenever two (or more) pitchers tied for the final spot among the major leagues’ top one-fifth, the pitcher with the fewest Losses was included in the totals for averaging.
– All stats for the strike-shortened seasons of 1972, 1981, 1994, and 1995 have been pro-rated to 162 games.