The Value Production Standings: 2002-2004
Our previous installments have examined 1946-1950, 1951-1955, 1956-1960, 1961-1965, 1966-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997, and 1998-2001. Now it’s time to move into the era of The Osbournes, Norah Jones and My Big Fat Greek Wedding.
For a review of our methodology, please see the References and Resources section below.
Here’s the key to the figures we’re examining:
WSP = Win Shares Produced: the total of major league Win Shares produced that season by all players credited to the organization
Lg. WSP = League Win Shares Produced: the percentage of the league total of WSP credited to the organization
MLB WSP = Major league baseball Win Shares Produced: the percentage of the MLB-wide total of WSP credited to the organization
W = Wins: the actual win total of the team that season
Lg. W = League Wins: the percentage of the league win total won by the team
W% – WSP% = League Wins minus League Win Shares Produced: a measure of how much better or worse a team actually performed than the league-wide value produced by its organization
Avg WSP = Average Win Shares Produced: the average WSP of the teams in a given division or league
%MLB Avg = Percentage of the major league baseball average: how the average WSP for a given division or league compares with the overall major league average
The 2002 Value Production Standings
AL Organization WSP Lg. WSP MLB WSP W Lg. W W% - WSP% Avg. WSP % MLB Avg. Blue Jays 400 11.2% 5.8% 78 6.9% -4.3% Yankees 314 8.8% 4.5% 103 9.1% 0.3% Red Sox 278 7.8% 4.0% 93 8.2% 0.4% Orioles 144 4.0% 2.1% 67 5.9% 1.9% Devil Rays 61 1.7% 0.9% 55 4.9% 3.2% East Division 1197 33.7% 17.4% 396 35.1% 1.5% 239 104.1% Indians 325 9.1% 4.7% 74 6.6% -2.6% Twins 284 8.0% 4.1% 94 8.3% 0.4% White Sox 251 7.0% 3.6% 81 7.2% 0.1% Royals 211 5.9% 3.1% 62 5.5% -0.4% Tigers 188 5.3% 2.7% 55 4.9% -0.4% Central Division 1259 35.4% 18.2% 366 32.4% -2.9% 252 109.5% Athletics 302 8.5% 4.4% 103 9.1% 0.6% Mariners 299 8.4% 4.3% 93 8.2% -0.2% Angels 258 7.2% 3.7% 99 8.8% 1.5% Rangers 238 6.7% 3.4% 72 6.4% -0.3% West Division 1097 30.9% 15.9% 367 32.5% 1.6% 274 119.3% AL Total 3553 100.0% 51.5% 1129 100% 0.0% 254 110.4% NL Organization WSP Lg. WSP MLB WSP W Lg. W W% - WSP% Avg. WSP % MLB Avg. Expos 360 10.8% 5.2% 83 6.4% -4.4% Braves 298 8.9% 4.3% 101 7.8% -1.1% Mets 220 6.6% 3.2% 75 5.8% -0.8% Phillies 201 6.0% 2.9% 80 6.2% 0.2% Marlins 169 5.1% 2.4% 79 6.1% 1.0% East Division 1248 37.3% 18.1% 418 32.3% -5.0% 250 108.5% Astros 299 8.9% 4.3% 84 6.5% -2.5% Cardinals 236 7.1% 3.4% 97 7.5% 0.4% Pirates 204 6.1% 3.0% 72 5.6% -0.5% Reds 203 6.1% 2.9% 78 6.0% 0.0% Cubs 193 5.8% 2.8% 67 5.2% -0.6% Brewers 107 3.2% 1.5% 56 4.3% 1.1% Central Division 1242 37.1% 18.0% 454 35.0% -2.1% 207 90.0% Dodgers 311 9.3% 4.5% 92 7.1% -2.2% Padres 163 4.9% 2.4% 66 5.1% 0.2% Giants 148 4.4% 2.1% 95 7.3% 2.9% Rockies 128 3.8% 1.9% 73 5.6% 1.8% Diamondbacks 106 3.2% 1.5% 98 7.6% 4.4% West Division 856 25.6% 12.4% 424 32.7% 7.1% 171 74.4% NL Total 3346 100.0% 48.5% 1296 100.0% 0.0% 209 90.9% MLB Total 6899 n/a 100% 2425 n/a n/a 230 100.0%
By the end of 2002, it was obvious that the Arizona Diamondbacks were the most instantly successful expansion team in history. In just five seasons of existence, they’d captured three division flags and a World Series title. As we noted last time, the D-backs’ primary strategy was to eschew the traditional expansion-franchise wisdom of patiently building with young players. Instead (taking full advantage of the free agency system), they’d spent freely in stocking the roster with high-priced, big-name veteran stars. Their 2002 division-winner was anchored by 38-year-old superstar Randy Johnson (capturing his fourth consecutive Cy Young Award in the Valley of the Sun), 35-year-old fellow ace Curt Schilling, 37-year-old center fielder Steve Finley and 34-year-old left fielder Luis Gonzalez.
Less obvious, but equally true, was that under GM Joe Garagiola Jr., Arizona simultaneously was building a very strong farm system. In 2002, the Diamondbacks passed the 100 mark in WSP, becoming the first expansion franchise to reach that talent production level in just five years. Key contributors to their ’02 success were second baseman Junior Spivey and relief ace Byung-Hyun Kim, as well as setup reliever Mike Koplove, all home-grown.
Moreover, Arizona’s abundance of outstanding system-produced prospects had allowed the team to trade pitcher Vicente Padilla and first baseman Travis Lee as part of the package to acquire Schilling, as well as surrendering pitchers Brad Penny and Vladimir Nunez in a far less fruitful trade for reliever Matt Mantei.
In stark contrast stood the Brewers, who’d been around for more than 30 years but whose system contributed just 107 Win Shares to the major leagues in 2002, as the team floundered to its worst-ever 56-106 record. Milwaukee hadn’t been a contender for a long time, but while the Brewers had been mediocre through the 1990s under GM Sal Bando, they hadn’t been downright bad, either in on-field performance or in aggregate farm system production. But with GM Dean Taylor in charge since late 1999, the Brewers’ farm had suddenly turned into a dust bowl: only a single Milwaukee product delivered more than 10 Win Shares in 2002, and that one—Gary Sheffield, now with the Braves—had long ago been sent away.
The 2003 Value Production Standings
AL Organization WSP Lg. WSP MLB WSP W Lg. W W% - WSP% Avg. WSP % MLB Avg. Blue Jays 413 11.9% 5.9% 86 7.7% -4.2% Yankees 319 9.2% 4.6% 101 9.0% -0.2% Red Sox 240 6.9% 3.5% 95 8.5% 1.5% Orioles 143 4.1% 2.1% 71 6.3% 2.2% Devil Rays 86 2.5% 1.2% 63 5.6% 3.1% East Division 1201 34.8% 17.4% 416 37.0% 2.4% 240 104.1% Twins 265 7.6% 3.8% 90 8.0% 0.4% Indians 263 7.6% 3.8% 68 6.1% -1.5% Royals 237 6.8% 3.4% 83 7.4% 0.6% White Sox 210 6.1% 3.0% 86 7.7% 1.6% Tigers 147 4.2% 2.1% 43 3.8% -0.4% Central Division 1122 32.5% 16.2% 370 32.9% 0.6% 224 97.3% Mariners 335 9.7% 4.8% 93 8.3% -1.4% Rangers 299 8.7% 4.3% 71 6.3% -2.3% Athletics 290 8.4% 4.2% 96 8.5% 0.2% Angels 201 5.8% 2.9% 77 6.9% 1.1% West Division 1125 32.6% 16.3% 337 30.0% -2.6% 281 121.9% AL Total 3448 100.0% 49.8% 1123 100% 0.0% 248 106.7% NL Organization WSP Lg. WSP MLB WSP W Lg. W W% - WSP% Avg. WSP % MLB Avg. Expos 369 10.6% 5.3% 83 6.4% -4.3% Braves 275 7.9% 4.0% 101 7.7% -0.2% Mets 225 6.5% 3.2% 66 5.1% -1.4% Marlins 207 6.0% 3.0% 91 7.0% 1.0% Phillies 180 5.2% 2.6% 86 6.6% 1.4% East Division 1256 36.2% 18.1% 427 32.7% -3.5% 251 108.9% Astros 324 9.3% 4.7% 87 6.7% -2.7% Pirates 222 6.4% 3.2% 75 5.7% -0.6% Cubs 219 6.3% 3.2% 88 6.7% 0.4% Cardinals 213 6.1% 3.1% 85 6.5% 0.4% Reds 187 5.4% 2.7% 69 5.3% -0.1% Brewers 167 4.8% 2.4% 68 5.2% 0.4% Central Division 1332 38.3% 19.2% 472 36.1% -2.2% 222 96.2% Dodgers 249 7.2% 3.6% 85 6.5% -0.7% Giants 176 5.1% 2.5% 100 7.7% 2.6% Padres 164 4.7% 2.4% 64 4.9% 0.2% Diamondbacks 162 4.7% 2.3% 84 6.4% 1.8% Rockies 135 3.9% 1.9% 74 5.7% 1.8% West Division 886 25.5% 12.8% 407 31.2% 5.7% 177 76.8% NL Total 3474 100.0% 50.2% 1306 100.0% 0.0% 217 94.1% MLB Total 6922 n/a 100% 2429 n/a n/a 231 100.0%
While not nearly as consistently successful as the Diamondbacks, the Florida Marlins were proving to be a singularly remarkable expansion franchise story. In 2003 they achieved just their second over-.500 season in 11 years of operation, yet with it they also captured their second wild card, their second pennant and their second World Series victory.
The Marlins’ ’03 triumph was especially noteworthy in the way it capped a rebuilding process, designed by GM Dave Dombrowski and completed under Larry Beinfest. (To be candid, however, it wasn’t always clear exactly what the team’s roster strategy was beyond payroll control.) The process came together in the aftermath of previous owner Wayne Huizenga’s talent evisceration of 1997-98.
Like the Diamondbacks, whatever else the Marlins had done over the years, they had built a strong farm system. In 2003 they surpassed 200 WSP for the first time; they weren’t the best expansion franchise at the 11-season mark in that regard (the Astros and Mets had produced significantly more talent at that point in their journeys), but the Marlins were doing well in talent production, certainly better than their expansion cohort, the Rockies.
The 2003 Florida club was quite young and nicely balanced, and featured several key home-grown talents in second baseman Luis Castillo, shortstop Alex Gonzalez, rookie outfielder-third baseman Miguel Cabrera and pitcher Josh Beckett. The only key player on the roster who was more than 30 was one of the team’s few free agent acquisitions, 31-year-old star catcher Ivan Rodriguez.
Marlins products who were excelling in other uniforms in 2003 included shortstop Edgar Renteria (Cardinals), pitcher Livan Hernandez (Expos), outfielders Randy Winn (Mariners) and Mark Kotsay (Padres) and first baseman-outfielder Kevin Millar (Red Sox).
The Rangers had entered the American League as an expansion franchise in 1961, and in the ensuing 40-plus years had experienced more than their share of frustration. Yet things had seemed to be looking up: Under GM Doug Melvin in the 1990s, the Rangers had demonstrated a consistently strong farm system and a highly competitive ball club. As recently as 1999, they’d led the AL West in WSP, while winning their third division championship in four years. With fresh-off-his-Cleveland-success John Hart taking over as GM in late 2001, and with young superstar shortstop Alex Rodriguez having been secured in a megabucks free agent contract, Texas in the early 2000s had appeared to be poised for a run of strong contention.
But it just didn’t pan out. Despite spectacular performance from A-Rod, the team was a dud, utterly unable to sustain a competent supporting cast, and particularly bereft of pitching. Thus in all their agonizing franchise history, few seasons would surpass 2003 on the frustration meter. The ’03 Rangers finished last in the AL West for the fourth straight year, despite organizational production of 299 Win Shares, fourth-most in the American League.
Texas did feature two home-grown young stars joining Rodriguez—third baseman Hank Blalock and first baseman Mark Teixeira—but too many of the best Ranger products were elsewhere, including Pudge Rodriguez with the Marlins and outfielders Sammy Sosa (Cubs) and Scott Podsednik (Brewers), pitchers Kevin Brown (Dodgers) and Kenny Rogers (Twins), shortstop Rich Aurilia (Giants) and designated hitter Travis Hafner (Indians).
Texas owner Tom Hicks would react by ordering Hart to unload A-Rod via trade, even sweetening the deal by agreeing to continue to pay a portion of his salary. While this certainly wasn’t passive acceptance of the situation, it was, to say the least, highly questionable whether it did anything to address the Rangers’ problems.
In 2003 the Tigers descended to the nadir of their century-long history, lurching to a catastrophic 43-119 campaign. Unsurprisingly, the organization that year yielded a meager 147 WSP, a mark that was Detroit’s lowest in a non-strike-shortened season since we began calculating these figures from 1946. Yet while this was the low point, the franchise hadn’t been among the leaders in farm system production in decades. The Tigers hadn’t been as close as second place in their division in WSP since 1981, and in the 58 seasons since 1946, the Tigers had been first in WSP just one time, their world championship season of 1968.
The 2004 Value Production Standings
AL Organization WSP Lg. WSP MLB WSP W Lg. W W% - WSP% Avg. WSP % MLB Avg. Blue Jays 363 10.4% 5.2% 67 5.9% -4.5% Yankees 309 8.9% 4.4% 101 8.9% 0.1% Red Sox 273 7.8% 3.9% 98 8.6% 0.8% Orioles 177 5.1% 2.5% 78 6.9% 1.8% Devil Rays 119 3.4% 1.7% 70 6.2% 2.8% East Division 1241 35.8% 17.9% 414 36.5% 0.9% 248 107.2% Indians 298 8.5% 4.3% 80 7.1% -1.5% Twins 248 7.1% 3.6% 92 8.1% 1.0% Royals 226 6.5% 3.2% 58 5.1% -1.4% Tigers 189 5.4% 2.7% 72 6.3% 0.9% White Sox 166 4.8% 2.4% 83 7.3% 2.6% Central Division 1127 32.5% 16.2% 385 34.0% 1.7% 225 97.3% Mariners 303 8.7% 4.4% 63 5.6% -3.2% Rangers 299 8.6% 4.3% 89 7.8% -0.8% Athletics 289 8.3% 4.1% 91 8.0% -0.3% Angels 206 5.9% 3.0% 92 8.1% 2.2% West Division 1097 31.7% 15.8% 335 29.5% -2.1% 274 118.4% AL Total 3465 100.0% 49.9% 1134 100% 0.0% 248 106.8% NL Organization WSP Lg. WSP MLB WSP W Lg. W W% - WSP% Avg. WSP % MLB Avg. Expos 316 9.1% 4.5% 67 5.2% -3.9% Braves 257 7.4% 3.7% 96 7.4% 0.0% Phillies 219 6.3% 3.1% 86 6.6% 0.4% Marlins 209 6.0% 3.0% 83 6.4% 0.4% Mets 179 5.1% 2.6% 71 5.5% 0.3% East Division 1180 33.9% 17.0% 403 31.1% -2.7% 236 101.9% Astros 387 11.1% 5.5% 92 7.1% -4.0% Pirates 271 7.8% 3.9% 72 5.6% -2.2% Cardinals 211 6.1% 3.0% 105 8.1% 2.1% Reds 192 5.5% 2.8% 76 5.9% 0.4% Cubs 182 5.2% 2.6% 89 6.9% 1.7% Brewers 159 4.6% 2.3% 67 5.2% 0.6% Central Division 1402 40.2% 20.2% 501 38.7% -1.5% 234 100.9% Dodgers 247 7.1% 3.5% 93 7.2% 0.1% Padres 182 5.2% 2.6% 87 6.7% 1.5% Rockies 181 5.2% 2.6% 68 5.3% 0.1% Giants 165 4.7% 2.4% 91 7.0% 2.3% Diamondbacks 127 3.6% 1.8% 51 3.9% 0.3% West Division 902 25.9% 13.0% 390 30.1% 4.2% 180 77.9% NL Total 3484 100.0% 50.1% 1294 100.0% 0.0% 218 94.0% MLB Total 6949 n/a 100% 2428 n/a n/a 232 100.0%
Several stories continued to pursue familiar trajectories in 2004.
The major-league-WSP-leader Astros continued to display the terrific farm system production that had distinguished the organization for the past few years, as 2004 marked the sixth consecutive season they led the NL Central in WSP. Along with that, Houston continued to be a strongly contending ball club: In 2004, the Astros were the NL wild card winner, achieving their fifth post-season qualification in eight years.
The Blue Jays continued to display the equally terrific farm system production that led the AL East in WSP for the fifth straight year (and eighth time in 11 years). They also had led all MLB in WSP in 2002 and 2003—after having been eclipsed in that competition by the Astros in 2001. Yet the on-field success that Houston had found continued to be elusive in Toronto. In 2004, the Blue Jays finished last (trailing even the ever-hapless Devil Rays), and they hadn’t been a serious contender since 1993.
The Expos led the NL East in WSP for the 13th straight year, yet their talent diaspora had them in last place on the field. This was particularly disappointing after the Expos had managed slightly-above-.500 performances in both 2002 and 2003. It was their final season in Montreal; the franchise, now jointly owned by the rest of Major League Baseball, was moved to Washington, D.C., as the next stage in a long, sad and largely unscrupulous episode.
While not quite as dramatic a case as the Expos, the Pirates were another organization that was consistently uncompetitive on the field despite having produced significant talent. In 2004 they were second in the National League in WSP, but at 72-89 were trudging through their 12th consecutive losing season. Free agent defections and incomprehensible deals executed by GMs Cam Bonifay and Dave Littlefield had combined to create a situation in which the bulk of Pittsburgh’s system-developed talent was gone.
Catcher Jason Kendall, infielder-outfielder Rob Mackowiak and pitcher Mike Gonzalez were still on board, but the list of Pirate exports included outfielders Barry Bonds (winning his fourth straight MVP award with the Giants), Moises Alou (Cubs) and Jose Guillen (Angels), third baseman Aramis Ramirez (Cubs), infielder Tony Womack (Cardinals) and pitchers Tim Wakefield and Bronson Arroyo (Red Sox) and Esteban Loaiza (White Sox–Yankees).
The story in San Francisco, while just as familiar, couldn’t have been more different. The Giants in 2004 finished a close second at 91-71, their eighth straight winning season in a run that had seen them capture three division titles, a wild card berth and a pennant. Through it all, the Giants’ organizational talent production had been consistently below average; only three MLB teams in 2004 posted lower WSP totals than the Giants’ feeble 165, and San Francisco’s 91-game-winner that year included not a single home-grown player with more than 10 Win Shares.
Obviously Bonds, probably the biggest-impact free agent signing in history, was the key to the Giants’ success. But GM Brian Sabean had made many other effective acquisitions over the years, via trade, free agency and scrap-heap scavenge. The 2004 Giants received 91 Win Shares from five Sabean pickups: ace pitcher Jason Schmidt (the Sporting News NL Pitcher of the Year, acquired in trade for Armando Rios), first baseman J.T. Snow (acquired in trade for Allen Watson) and second baseman Ray Durham, third baseman Edgardo Alfonzo and center fielder Marquis Grissom (all signed as free agents).
The Value Production Standings Summary, 1946-2004
American League
Year NYY DET BOS CLE OAK MIN BAL CHW CAL WAS AL WSP 1946 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 x x 56.5% 1947 1 2 4 3 5 6 8 7 x x 55.3% 1948 1 3 4 2 5 7 6 8 x x 55.6% 1949 1 3T 3T 2 5 7 6 8 x x 51.9% 1950 1 3 4 2 7 6 5 8 x x 50.5% 1951 2 4 3 1 5 6 8 7 x x 49.0% 1952 1 4 3 2 5 6 8 7 x x 47.9% 1953 2 4 3 1 7 6 8 5 x x 46.2% 1954 1T 4 3 1T 7 6 8 5 x x 47.5% 1955 1 4 2 3 5 6 8 7 x x 46.7% 1956 1 4 2 3 7 5 8 6 x x 47.1% 1957 1 4 2 3 6 8 7 5 x x 46.3% 1958 1 4 3 2 8 7 6 5 x x 46.4% 1959 1 4 3 2 8 7 5 6 x x 46.5% 1960 1 5 3 2 8 7 4 6 x x 46.0% 1961 1 4 3 2 8 7 5 6 9 10 48.3% 1962 1 3 4 2 8 6 5 7 10 9 43.1% 1963 1 5 4 2 8 7 3 6 10 9 43.6% 1964 1 3 4 5 8 7 2 6 9 10 45.0% 1965 1 2 7 4 8 6 3 5 9 10 44.5% 1966 1 3 6 5 7 8 2 4 9 10 44.4% 1967 7 4 1 6 8 3 2 5 9 10 45.5% 1968 7 1 4 5 2 8 3 6 9 10 45.8%
American League East Division
Year BAL DET BOS NYY CLE WAS Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1969 1 2 3 4 5 6 259 108.3% 27.1% 45.3%
1970 2 4 1 3 5 6 260 108.3% 27.1% 44.7%
1971 2 3 4 1 5 6 244 101.5% 25.4% 46.0%
BAL DET BOS NYY CLE MIL Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1972 1 5 2 4 3 6 219 95.4% 23.9% 43.0%
1973 1 5 2 4 3 6 219 91.5% 22.9% 42.0%
1974 2 3 1 4 5 6 215 90.5% 22.6% 43.8%
1975 2 4 1 3 5 6 193 81.6% 20.4% 44.4%
1976 2 4 1 5 3 6 204 85.9% 21.5% 44.3%
BAL DET BOS NYY CLE MIL TOR Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1977 1 3 2 5 4 6 7 193 82.2% 22.1% 46.1%
1978 2 3 1 5 4 6 7 210 88.9% 23.9% 46.7%
1979 2 3 1 6 5 4 7 213 90.7% 24.4% 47.7%
1980 3 2 1 6 4 5 7 199 84.9% 22.8% 49.4%
1981 3 2 1 6 4 5 7 138 89.2% 24.0% 49.0%
1982 2 3 1 6 5 4 7 215 91.0% 24.5% 47.7%
1983 2 5 1 4 6 3 7 222 94.7% 25.5% 48.0%
1984 2 4 1 3 5 6 7 206 87.0% 23.4% 47.1%
1985 3 4 1 2 7 5 6 206 87.6% 23.6% 47.7%
1986 3 5 1 2 6 4 7 200 85.6% 23.0% 47.7%
1987 5 4 1 3 6 2 7 216 91.3% 24.6% 49.3%
1988 6 5 1 3 4 2 7 216 91.7% 24.7% 49.2%
1989 4 6 1 3 5 2 7 211 88.6% 23.9% 49.9%
1990 6 5 1 2 7 4 3 215 90.8% 24.4% 50.1%
1991 6 4 1 2 7 4 5 212 89.2% 24.0% 50.9%
1992 4 6 3 2 7 1 5 219 91.4% 24.6% 51.6%
1993 6 5 3 1 7 4 2 227 96.0% 24.0% 51.5%
BAL DET BOS NYY TOR Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1994 4 5 3 2 1 190 114.0% 20.4% 53.0%
1995 5 4 3 1 2 222 105.9% 18.9% 53.2%
1996 4 5 3 1 2 251 106.1% 18.9% 53.9%
1997 4 5 3 2 1 272 115.0% 20.5% 53.7%
BAL TBD BOS NYY TOR Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1998 4 5 3 2 1 227 97.3% 16.2% 51.8%
1999 4 5 3 1 2 224 96.0% 16.0% 52.6%
2000 4 5 3 2 1 221 94.6% 15.8% 51.4%
2001 4 5 3 2 1 221 95.3% 15.9% 51.8%
2002 4 5 3 2 1 239 104.1% 17.4% 51.5%
2003 4 5 3 2 1 240 104.1% 17.4% 49.8%
2004 4 5 3 2 1 248 107.2% 17.9% 49.9%
American League Central Division
Year KCR MIN CHW MIL CLE Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALC WSP AL WSP
1994 1 2 3 4 5 163 97.8% 17.5% 53.0%
1995 1 2 5 4 3 210 100.0% 17.9% 53.2%
1996 2 1 5 3 4 241 101.6% 18.1% 53.9%
1997 4 2T 5 2T 1 231 97.9% 17.5% 53.7%
KCR MIN CHW DET CLE Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALC WSP AL WSP
1998 3 2 5 4 1 243 104.2% 17.4% 51.8%
1999 4 2T 2T 5 1 269 115.0% 19.2% 52.6%
2000 4 2 3 5 1 249 106.6% 17.8% 51.4%
2001 3 2 4 5 1 268 115.7% 19.3% 51.8%
2002 4 2 3 5 1 252 109.5% 18.2% 51.5%
2003 3 1 4 5 2 224 97.3% 16.2% 49.8%
2004 3 2 5 4 1 225 97.3% 16.2% 49.9%
American League West Division
Year OAK MIN CHW CAL KCR MIL Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1969 1 2 3 4 5T 5T 175 73.0% 18.2% 45.3%
1970 1 2 3 4 5 6 169 70.4% 17.6% 44.7%
1971 1 3 4 2 6 5 198 82.3% 20.6% 46.0%
OAK MIN CHW CAL KCR TEX Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1972 1 2 3 4 6 5 177 76.8% 19.2% 43.0%
1973 1 2 3 4 6 5 183 76.5% 19.1% 42.0%
1974 1 2 5 4 6 3 201 84.7% 21.2% 43.8%
1975 1 2 5 3 6 4 228 96.2% 24.0% 44.4%
1976 1 4 5 2 6 3 217 91.5% 22.9% 44.3%
OAK MIN CHW CAL KCR TEX SEA Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1977 1 2 6 4 5 3 7 209 88.9% 23.9% 46.1%
1978 1 3 6 4 5 2 7 200 84.5% 22.7% 46.7%
1979 1 4T 6 2 4T 3 7 203 86.5% 23.3% 47.7%
1980 1 4 6 5 3 2 7 231 98.7% 26.6% 49.4%
1981 1 5 6 3 4 2 7 143 92.6% 24.9% 49.0%
1982 1 5 6 4 3 2 7 204 86.2% 23.2% 47.7%
1983 2 5 6 1 4 3 7 196 83.5% 22.5% 48.0%
1984 3 4 6 1 2 5 7 207 87.8% 23.6% 47.1%
1985 3 5 7 2 1 4 6 210 89.6% 24.1% 47.7%
1986 2 5 7 1 4 3 6 213 91.4% 24.6% 47.7%
1987 2 6 7 4 1 3 5 217 91.9% 24.7% 49.3%
1988 2 4 7 3 1 6 5 214 90.9% 24.5% 49.2%
1989 4 5 7 3 2 5 1 230 96.7% 26.0% 49.9%
1990 3 6 7 4 2 5 1 226 95.4% 25.7% 50.1%
1991 1 7 6 5 3 4 2 237 99.7% 26.8% 50.9%
1992 1 6 5 2 4 3 7 239 100.1% 27.0% 51.6%
1993 4 6 7 3 2 1 5 260 110.0% 27.5% 51.5%
OAK TEX SEA ANA Avg. WSP % ML Avg. ALW WSP AL WSP
1994 1 2 4 3 178 106.4% 15.2% 53.0%
1995 2 1 4 3 241 114.7% 16.4% 53.2%
1996 2 1 4 3 278 117.5% 16.8% 53.9%
1997 3 2 4 1 260 109.9% 15.7% 53.7%
1998 1 2 4 3 319 136.7% 18.2% 51.8%
1999 2 1 3 4 306 131.1% 17.5% 52.6%
2000 1 2 4 3 313 133.9% 17.9% 51.4%
2001 1 2 3 4 289 125.0% 16.7% 51.8%
2002 1 4 2 3 274 119.3% 15.9% 51.5%
2003 3 2 1 4 281 121.9% 16.3% 49.8%
2004 3 2 1 4 274 118.4% 15.8% 49.9%
National League
Year STL LAD CHC CIN PHI PIT ATL SFG HOU NYM NL WSP 1946 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 x x 43.5% 1947 1 2 4 3 7 6 8 5 x x 44.7% 1948 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 5 x x 44.4% 1949 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 6 x x 48.1% 1950 1 2 5 6 4 7 8 3 x x 49.5% 1951 1 2 5 4 6 7 8 3 x x 51.0% 1952 1 2 5 4 6 8 7 3 x x 52.1% 1953 2 1 7 4 5 8 3 6 x x 53.8% 1954 2 1 7 5 6 8 3 4 x x 52.5% 1955 3 1 6 5 7 8 2 4 x x 53.3% 1956 2 1 8 4 6 7 3 5 x x 52.9% 1957 2 1 7 5 4 8 3 6 x x 53.7% 1958 4 1 8 6 7 5 2 3 x x 53.6% 1959 3 1 7 5 8 6 2 4 x x 53.5% 1960 3 1 8 6 7 5 4 2 x x 54.0% 1961 2 1 7 5 8 6 3 4 x x 51.7% 1962 4 1 7 5 8 6 2 3 9 10 56.9% 1963 5 1 7 4 8 6 3 2 9 10 56.4% 1964 6 3 7 4 8 5 2 1 9 10 55.0% 1965 6 2 8 3 7 5 4 1 9 10 55.5% 1966 6 4 7 2 8 5 3 1 9 10 55.6% 1967 5 3 6 2 7 8 4 1 9 10 54.5% 1968 5 4 6 2 8 7 3 1 9 10 54.2%
National League East Division
Year PIT STL CHC NYM PHI MON FLA Avg. WSP % ML Avg. NLE WSP NL WSP
1969 1 2 3 4 5 6 x 218 91.1% 22.8% 54.7%
1970 1 2 4 5 3 6 x 221 91.9% 23.0% 55.3%
1971 1 3 5 2 4 6 x 230 95.7% 23.9% 54.0%
1972 1 2 4 3 5 6 x 244 106.1% 26.5% 57.0%
1973 1 3 5 2 4 6 x 239 99.7% 24.9% 58.0%
1974 1 4 5 3 2 6 x 249 104.9% 26.2% 56.2%
1975 1 2 5 3 4 6 x 247 104.2% 26.1% 55.6%
1976 1 2 5 3 4 6 x 254 106.8% 26.7% 55.7%
1977 1 2 5 4 3 6 x 290 123.4% 28.5% 53.9%
1978 1 3 5 4 2 6 x 285 120.7% 27.9% 53.3%
1979 1 3 6 4 2 5 x 289 123.5% 28.5% 52.3%
1980 1 2 6 4 3 5 x 280 119.7% 27.6% 50.6%
1981 1 2 6 3 4 5 x 185 119.5% 27.6% 51.0%
1982 1 3 6 5 2 4 x 289 122.3% 28.2% 52.3%
1983 3 1 6 5 2 4 x 272 115.8% 26.7% 52.0%
1984 2 3 6 4 1 5 x 280 118.5% 27.4% 52.9%
1985 4 2 6 3 1 5 x 276 117.7% 27.2% 52.3%
1986 4 3 6 2 1 5 x 280 120.0% 27.7% 52.3%
1987 5 2 6 3 1 4 x 272 115.2% 26.6% 50.7%
1988 2 5 4 1 3 6 x 280 119.0% 27.5% 50.8%
1989 2 6 4 1 3 5 x 271 113.8% 26.3% 50.1%
1990 2 6 4 1 5 3 x 280 118.4% 27.3% 49.9%
1991 1 6 5 2 4 3 x 269 113.2% 26.1% 49.1%
1992 2 3 4 5 6 1 x 271 113.4% 26.2% 48.4%
1993 2 3 5 4 6 1 7 233 98.6% 24.7% 48.5%
MON ATL FLA NYM PHI Avg. WSP % ML Avg. NLE WSP NL WSP
1994 1 2 5 3 4 146 87.6% 15.6% 47.0%
1995 1 2 5 3 4 180 85.9% 15.3% 46.8%
1996 1 2 5 3 4 198 83.7% 14.9% 46.1%
1997 1 2 5 3 4 208 87.9% 15.7% 46.3%
1998 1 2 5 3 4 224 96.2% 16.0% 48.2%
1999 1 2 5 3 4 217 92.8% 15.5% 47.4%
2000 1 3 5 2 4 245 105.2% 17.5% 48.6%
2001 1 2 5 3 4 228 98.3% 16.4% 48.2%
2002 1 2 5 3 4 250 108.5% 18.1% 48.5%
2003 1 2 4 3 5 251 108.9% 18.1% 50.2%
2004 1 2 4 5 3 236 101.9% 16.9% 50.1%
National League Central Division
Year STL PIT CHC CIN HOU MIL Avg. WSP % ML Avg. NLC WSP NL WSP 1994 1 2 3 4 5 x 175 105.0% 18.8% 47.0% 1995 2 1 3 4 5 x 223 106.4% 19.0% 46.8% 1996 2 1 3T 3T 5 x 243 102.5% 18.3% 46.1% 1997 2 1 4 5 3 x 238 100.7% 18.0% 46.3% 1998 6 1 4 5 3 2 230 98.4% 19.7% 48.2% 1999 4 6 5 3 1 2 221 94.6% 18.9% 47.4% 2000 4 2T 6 5 1 2T 221 94.6% 18.9% 48.6% 2001 2 3 4 6 1 5 233 100.8% 20.1% 48.2% 2002 2 3 5 4 1 6 207 90.0% 18.0% 48.5% 2003 4 2 3 5 1 6 222 96.2% 19.2% 50.2% 2004 3 2 5 4 1 6 234 100.9% 20.1% 50.1%
National League West Division
Year SFG CIN ATL LAD HOU SDP COL Avg. WSP % ML Avg. NLW WSP NL WSP
1969 1 2 3 4 5 6 x 306 127.7% 31.9% 54.7%
1970 1 2 3 4 5 6 x 311 129.4% 32.3% 55.3%
1971 1 2 3 4 5 6 x 289 120.4% 30.1% 54.0%
1972 2 1 4 5 3 6 x 280 121.7% 30.4% 57.0%
1973 1 2 5 3 4 6 x 317 132.2% 33.1% 58.0%
1974 2 1 5 3 4 6 x 285 120.0% 30.0% 56.2%
1975 1 2 5 4 3 6 x 279 118.0% 29.5% 55.6%
1976 1 3 5 2 4 6 x 275 115.9% 29.0% 55.7%
1977 1 3 5 2 4 6 x 259 110.3% 25.5% 53.9%
1978 1 3 4 2 5 6 x 261 110.3% 25.5% 53.3%
1979 1 3 5 2 4 6 x 242 103.1% 23.8% 52.3%
1980 4 1 5 2 3 6 x 233 99.5% 23.0% 50.6%
1981 4 2 3 1 5 6 x 157 101.6% 23.5% 51.0%
1982 5 2 3 1 4 6 x 247 104.4% 24.1% 52.3%
1983 5 2 3 1 4 6 x 258 109.7% 25.3% 52.0%
1984 4 2 3 1 5 6 x 262 110.9% 25.6% 52.9%
1985 5 2 3 1 4 6 x 256 108.9% 25.1% 52.3%
1986 3 2 4 1 6 5 x 249 106.9% 24.7% 52.3%
1987 3 2 4 1 6 5 x 247 104.4% 24.1% 50.7%
1988 3T 2 3T 1 6 5 x 238 101.3% 23.4% 50.8%
1989 3 1 5 2 6 4 x 246 103.3% 23.8% 50.1%
1990 3 1 4 2 6 5 x 232 97.8% 22.6% 49.9%
1991 4 1 3 5 6 2 x 237 99.8% 23.0% 49.1%
1992 5 3 4 1 6 2 x 231 96.4% 22.2% 48.4%
1993 5 4 3 1 6 2 7 225 95.3% 23.8% 48.5%
SFG SDP COL LAD ARI Avg. WSP % ML Avg. NLW WSP NL WSP
1994 3 2 4 1 x 147 88.0% 12.6% 47.0%
1995 3 2 4 1 x 184 87.5% 12.5% 46.8%
1996 3 2 4 1 x 213 90.1% 12.9% 46.1%
1997 3 2 4 1 x 209 88.2% 12.6% 46.3%
1998 3 2 4 1 5 175 74.8% 12.5% 48.2%
1999 2 3 4 1 5 182 77.8% 13.0% 47.4%
2000 2 3 4 1 5 170 73.0% 12.2% 48.6%
2001 2 3 4 1 5 161 69.7% 11.6% 48.2%
2002 3 2 4 1 5 171 74.4% 12.4% 48.5%
2003 2 3 5 1 4 177 76.8% 12.8% 50.2%
2004 4 2 3 1 5 180 77.9% 12.9% 50.1%
References & Resources
Methodology
First, we identify every player in the major leagues each season with at least five career Win Shares. Then we identify which major league organization was responsible for originally signing and developing that player (or perhaps not originally signing him, but clearly being the organization most responsible for developing him). Finally, we credit every season’s production of major league Win Shares by that player to that organization, regardless of whether he actually played that season for that organization.
Sometimes it’s impossible to assign a player to one organization. Lots of players were signed by one team, but then acquired by another organization while still young minor leaguers. For such players, we assign half-credit to each of the two organizations (and in a few cases, we assign one-third-credit to each of three organizations).
In the early 2000s, a small but increasing number of players weren’t the products of any major league team’s farm system, having been purchased or signed as free agents from independent teams, either in the Mexican League, the Northern League, or increasingly, the Japanese Leagues. The Win Shares of such players aren’t counted in this analysis.